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Open Secrets and Knowing Smiles 
 
Abstract 
Given the importance of informal ways of getting things done in postsocialist societies, 
research into the field of unwritten rules and informal practices has been slow to 
develop. In studying such rules and practices, the researcher often encounters skepticism 
or hostility stemming from the ways in which people relate to tacit agreements. Or else, 
she is greeted by an ambivalent smile of complicity—a knowing smile. In this article I 
draw a connection between knowing smiles and open secrets and argue that these notions 
illuminate a great deal about how the ‘grey areas’ of social life function. I suggest that 
such seemingly trivial aspects of day-to-day life can reveal profound features of social 
institutions and point in the direction of innovative research.  
 
 
This paper is the outcome of years of exposure to people’s reactions to my research in 
Russia. When I did my fieldwork there in the 1990s and asked people to talk to me about 
blat—the use of personal networks for obtaining goods and services in short supply and 
for circumventing formal procedures—they smiled knowingly but then almost universally 
responded “Why ask me?” Reassured that I only want to know “what everybody knows,” 
most of my respondents were happy to discuss blat matters frankly, talking about others, 
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in generic terms, or about the past, but also coming up with personal examples.1 There 
were stronger reactions—my Russian academic advisor almost threw me out of her home 
when I explained which PhD topic I was working on, dismissing it as trivial or 
‘westernized.’ Fellow Russian academics sometimes refer to it in a disparaging way, 
people from Russian regions show disbelief that such a topic could constitute a subject 
matter of serious analysis and the witty come up with the pun “a PhD by blat, you mean?” 
Similar reactions followed my subsequent research into practices of black and grey piar 
(methods of political marketing and campaigning), related practices of kompromat (use of 
compromising materials), financial and barter scheming, telefonnoe pravo (oral 
commands and pressure on the judiciary) and other informal practices widespread in post-
Soviet Russia.  
I refer to one country, my country of origin, but I believe that my findings might 
be relevant for comparative study. My question is: ‘Why do people smile about 
commonplaces that are strictly speaking neither funny nor enjoyable in any obvious 
way?’ I split this question into three components: what is smiled at, how it is smiled at 
and what these smiles do. First, I argue that knowing smiles are indicative of open 
secrets, elusive in nature and intentionally ambiguous. Secondly, I analyze ambiguities of 
open secrets that knowing smiles disclose. Thirdly, I offer an interpretation of the subtlety 
and depth of seemingly superficial interactions exchanged in passing. I rely on the 
secondary analysis of materials used in my books and some new interviews but from an 
angle entirely left out of my previous research.  
When writing about theoretical commonplaces, Svetlana Boym recalls a peculiar 
form of “understanding with half-words” among Soviet intelligentsia as a mark of 
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belonging to an imagined community that exists on the margin of the official public 
sphere. “Communication with half-words secures the unspoken realm of cultural myths 
and protects the imagined community from outsiders and, in a way, from its own 
members,” she writes. I argue that knowing smiles are a visible sign of sharing and 
belonging, but are at the same time an expression of ambivalence. They are the signals of 
competence similar to a reaction of laughing at a joke but expressed in a non-humorous 
context, thus being robbed of the nature of the smile and loaded with the pressure of 
knowledge. 'Knowledge of what?’ is our first stop.  
 
Unwritten rules 
Consider Russia’s popular wisdom: ‘Russia is a country of unread laws and unwritten 
rules’. Or, as they say, ‘the imperfection of our laws is compensated for by their non-
observance’ (nesovershenstvo nashikh zakonov kompensiruetsya ikh nevypolneniem). 
This is a hint that would cause a flicker of a knowing smile or a chuckle. It is not that the 
requisite components of the rule of law are absent in Russia; rather, the ability of the rule 
of law to function coherently has been diverted by a powerful set of practices that has 
evolved organically in the post-Soviet milieu. An immediate grasp of the gap between the 
way things are claimed to be and the ways things are in practice constitutes an advantage 
enjoyed by an insider over outsiders, much more reliant on written sources of 
competence. The unwritten rules are non-verbal yet essential in understanding the order 
of things, whether in politics, economy or society.2   
Unwritten rules are not about knowing the rules, they are about shared rule-
following. Knowing a rule does not imply an ability to follow it, or mastery of it, just as 
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knowing a recipe does not assure practical skill in its implementation or knowing the 
literal meaning of a word does not automatically mean that one will use it correctly in 
context. In Wittgenstein’s terminology there are practices of ‘rule-following’ (i.e. being 
able to continue the sequence of numbers 2, 4, 6, 8,…) that are distinct from rules 
interpreted, explicated and understood (i.e. an ability to figure out the formulae of this 
sequence). In a classic example of chess playing, Wittgenstein shows that certain mastery 
and expertise can only be achieved by dealing with constraints in practice. 
A distinction between a rule and mastery of the rule can be illustrated by the 
metaphor of driving in Russia. To drive ‘properly,’ one has to mix both formal (traffic 
rules) and informal codes (conventions); to apply them as needed in appropriate contexts 
and to switch fluidly between them; and crucially, to negotiate oneself out of trouble if 
caught. This is apart from struggling to avoid potholes or traffic jams on the road by 
radical maneuvers and preserving an informal hierarchy of vehicles doing the same. In 
other words, unwritten rules are not only about how to follow the rules of the game but 
also about how to break them.    
Unwritten rules are the know-how needed to ‘navigate’ between formal and 
informal sets of constraints. Without being articulated, they ‘prescribe’ which rules to 
follow in which context and ‘set’ the best approach for getting things done. Applying one 
formal rule rather than another, using restrictions (quotas, filters etc.) and small print, 
enforcing some decisions but not the others are examples of how constraints can be 
mediated. The focus of unwritten rules is not on constraints per se, as in the case of 
formal and informal codes, but on the enabling aspects of those constraints. To put it 
more bluntly, unwritten rules define the ways of circumventing constraints, both formal 
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and informal, of manipulating their enforcement to one’s own advantage and of avoiding 
penalties by combining the three elements of the rules of the game creatively.3  
Unwritten rules exist in all societies, but predominate (and even become 
indispensable) in conditions of over-regulation and under-enforcement of formal rules; 
and especially where formal rules and informal codes do not constitute coherent rules of 
the game. North shows that when people perceive the structure of the rules of the system 
to be fair and just, transaction costs are low and enforcement costs are negligible, which 
helps the efficiency of the economy.4 When people perceive the system to be unjust, the 
costs of transactions go up. In other words, if one cannot follow both formal and informal 
sets of constraints coherently, this will be reflected in their merger and certain patterns of 
rule-following or unwritten rules. It might be tempting to think that unwritten rules are 
generally disadvantageous for the system. This is only true, however, if the rules of the 
game – formal and informal constraints and their enforcement – were tied to the public 
interest and were beneficial to economic performance. As this has not always been the 
case in Russia, the impact of unwritten rules is rather ambivalent.   
Cultural traditions in Russia separate the concept of justice from that of formal 
law, which is grasped in a discrepancy in connotations between the terms spravedlivost’ 
(justice) and zakonnost’ (lawfulness). In his study of Muscovite Political Folkways,5 
Edward Keenan explains such a gap between the informal and the formal in terms of 
political culture and distinguishes its enduring elements:  
 the operational basis of each setting is informal and traditional (lacking a 
necessary connection between real power and formal status);  
 decision-making is corporate and conspiratorial;  
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 stability and risk-avoidance are favoured over innovation and progress; and  
 there is a reluctance to promulgate systematic codified law (those who need to 
know the rules know them).  
Keenan’s conclusions about the nature of the Soviet system (his analysis predated the end 
of the USSR) have relevance for the examination of the post-Soviet era as well. These 
attributes of the system have not changed much during Russia’s transition to a market 
economy. In the same way that the planned economy was not really a planned economy 
and was actually run with help of tolkachi (‘pushers’ for the plan completion in industry), 
blat (use of personal networks for getting things done), pripiski (false reporting) and other 
informal practices, the market economy today is not really a market economy. This is due 
primarily to the key role that unwritten rules still play in the system.6 The state is partly 
responsible.  
Over the course of the 1990s, the public felt betrayed by the outcomes of 
privatization and placed all the blame on state institutions and bureaucrats who found 
ways to prosper, while abandoning the general population to its own devices—which 
facilitated petty corruption. At the level of ‘state capture’ and political corruption, the role 
of the state as a major shareholder in many large corporations is noteworthy. Insider deals 
have prevailed (particularly since 1995) as a method of state assets disposal, and other 
opaque corporate governance arrangements have proliferated.7 Since the 2000s, similar 
methods have been used for the state to reassert its control over the strategic sectors and 
key industries. These deals are impossible to decode without understanding the gap 
between formal institutions and informal ways of operating them, as well as it is 
impossible to fully decipher the ‘information wars’ and ‘kompromat (compromising 
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material) wars’ omnipresent in Russia of the 1990s.8 Unwritten rules also have played 
part in regulating non-monetary exchanges. Barter chains redistributing income among 
the ‘inner circle,’ as well as among firms and their multiple subsidiaries, have 
revolutionized practices of ‘give-and-take’ and have provided them with a legally 
amenable form.9  
All of these phenomena of the new Russian economy share an important feature—
agents at all levels employ practices that have come to be known as extralegal or 
informal—that is widely recognized. Yet the competence in agents’ mastery of unwritten 
rules is highly stratified. We might all smile in recognition of the gap between formal 
pronouncements and realities of the post-Soviet period but these general ‘open secrets’ 
about Russian privatization will remain ‘secrets’ for the majority of the public when it 
comes to detail. The stratified nature of open secrets (in particular professions, 
institutions, industries, enterprises, and even collectives and networks) is of direct 
relevance to our analysis of ‘knowing smiles’ and is to be considered next.10 
‘Common knowledge’ about the gap between the official discourse (whether on 
planned economy or market democracy) and the ways in which things are done in practice 
(like tolkachi and blat or financial scheming and managed democracy) constitutes an 
open secret. Exploring that gap and the ways in which it is bridged in a particular domain, 
identifying ‘grey areas’ and distinguishing ‘shades of grey’ are challenges for both 
researchers and policymakers. Commonplaces and other trivial aspects of day-to-day life 
can sometimes reveal profound features of societies that are hidden when tackling them 
directly. My methods here can be illustrated by Freud’s celebrated example of art forgery. 
To discover whether a painting is a forgery or not, the most effective way is to focus on 
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minor details, such as how the painter depicts fingernails or the slope of a thumb. Most 
forgers can fake the major aspects of what is portrayed—it is the tiny details that give 
them away. Freud argued the same is true of ‘trivial’ aspects of day-to-day life, like slips 
of the tongue. The apparently trivial elements are the key to understanding core 
dispositions of the personality and equally I am making the same argument about the 
‘disclosure’ of open secrets that the knowing smile represents. In developing this point I 
draw upon a variety of sources—Freud, Goffman, Simmel and Bourdieu—and seek to 
bring their insights together.  I have had to be inventive. So far as I can trace, neither 
knowing smiles nor open secrets have been analyzed in the social sciences, let alone the 
relationship between them.  
 
Open Secrets 
As a concept, an “open secret” has some resemblance to Torstein Veblen’s paradoxical 
concepts of “trained incapacity,” “conspicuous consumption,” “trained incapacity,” or to 
Peter Sloterdijk’s model of “enlightened false consciousness,” which clash their mutually 
exclusive parts in order to create a new meaning. People’s reactions to the paradox of 
‘unread laws and unwritten rules’—the knowing smiles—are the acknowledgement of 
understanding of such meaning, the meaning of the failed purpose.  For example, in the 
famous folklore definition of the six paradoxes of late socialism every paradox pointed to 
an open secret—an informal practice, widespread but hidden from outsiders: absenteeism 
in ‘no unemployment but nobody works’; false reporting in ‘nobody works but 
productivity increases’; shortages in ‘productivity increases but shops are empty’; blat in 
‘shops are empty but fridges are full’; unfair privileges in ‘fridges are full but nobody is 
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satisfied’; cynicism in ‘nobody is satisfied but all vote unanimously.’ These practices 
were not really unknown but ‘shameful’ for socialism and therefore hidden from the 
official discourse—thus making them its open secrets of socialism. Practical, or tacit, 
knowledge of the tensions expressed in paradoxes make smiles even more knowing.11 For 
insiders, it is not only about knowing an unwritten rule or an open secret in question, but 
also about social competence of handling them with an appropriate knowing smile in an 
appropriate context. Belonging and complicity expressed in knowing smiles reflect the 
key paradox of the totalitarian power that generated a ‘homo Sovieticus’ who brought it 
to its end. So went the seventh, post-socialist paradox: ‘all voted unanimously but the 
system collapsed anyway.’   
One might think that an open secret is not a secret at all, since it concerns things 
that ‘everyone knows’, whether within a particular group or more widely in a society. 
This view would be a mistake, however, because open secrets are only partly open. Open 
secrets are secrets in the sense that they are excluded from formal or official discourse but 
they are open in the sense that they are familiar and referred to in idioms and language 
games, though these often require explanation for outsiders. The ambiguity involved is a 
real and significant one. There is a tacit acceptance that what is known should remain 
unarticulated. Open secrets occupy areas of tension, where a public affirmation of 
knowledge would threaten other values or goods that those involved want to protect. This 
point is noted in Georg Simmel’s discussion of secrecy, which reveals its complexity and 
subtlety. Simmel defines secrecy as ‘consciously willed concealment’—open secrets are 
clearly still secrets according to this definition. Simmel makes the point that secrecy is a 
relative phenomenon, at least as soon as it is shared: ‘a secret that two know is never a 
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secret.’12 Goffman takes the idea further by opposing diplomatic, official and strategic 
secrets to secrets that presuppose everyday familiarity with one another's doings.13 The 
degree of openness is likely to correspond to the reaction when the secret is revealed or 
spoken about.14 However, he does not use the concept ‘open secret’ as such, nor does he 
pursue an argument as stated in this article. I define an open secret as unarticulated 
knowledge that everybody who is party of a transaction knows about but which no-one 
discusses in a direct way. There is considerable continuity in attitudes to open secrets 
between the later years of the Soviet Union and post-Soviet period, so we have to retrace 
briefly the evidence of open secrets that surface in the Soviet satire. 
In late Soviet movies, such as Danelia’s Afonia (1975), Mimino (1977), Osennii 
maraphon (Autumn Marathon, 1979), Riavanov’s Ironiia sud’by (The Irony of Fate, 
1975), Sluzhebnyi roman (An Office Romance, 1977), Garazh (The Garage, 1979) and 
Bortko’s Blondonka za uglom (The Blond Around the Corner, Bortko, 1984), convey 
attitudes regarding informal practices that are light and playful, even if meant to be 
corrective.15 They are ‘satiricized’ rather than genuinely satirical and target particular 
groups that engage in these practices rather than the practices themselves. Similar to 
Krokodil images, satirical films sought to co-opt Soviet audiences into a stigmatizing 
laughter, but at the same time they introduced techniques of handling open secrets and 
defined the boundaries of what was considered possible.  
Commonly recognized but rarely registered in written sources, apart from their 
“satirized” or “critical in a controlled way” images, inevitably linked with the defects of 
particular individuals rather than attributed with a systemic character, these practices 
testified to various ways in which socialism failed to satisfy individual needs. “Satirized” 
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images of Krokodil were acceptable because they never targeted the intrinsic failures of 
the Soviet system. Just about every part of everyday life was satirized, if not in the 
controlled discourse of Krokodil, then in anekdot. The failures of the system were out in 
the open but not acknowledged as systemic. They didn’t appear in the proceeding of the 
Central Committee. That’s what censorship did—it did not allow the formal admission of 
a failure on the part of the system—while reading official sources one could never come 
to the conclusion that the system that had emerged in the Soviet Union intrinsically was 
doomed to failure.16 The system could not exist without people circumventing the 
declared principles and was in fact dependent on people to take care of the systemic 
defects and to lubricate the rigidities of its constraints.17 The failures of the Soviet system, 
which all the insiders were complicit in reproducing, were its main open secrets, satirized, 
smiled at but… kept! 18 
Thus, on the one hand, blat was commonplace and its instances could make the 
front page of Krokodil in 1980s (without using the word blat). On the other hand, the 
political system keeps its reliance on informal practices hidden and shifts the 
responsibility for engaging in informal practices to individuals. Krokodil helped to 
promote the narrative of the “grand misrecognition game”: everybody does it (engages in 
informal practices, unofficial discourse, ‘doublethink’) but it has nothing to do with 
socialism. Although designed to create humor, Krokodil could not help being part of the 
political repressive machinery designed to introduce and reinforce moral/political 
standards. Uncovering a form of politics that pretends to be humor reveals a dimension of 
power that Bourdieu referred to as symbolic violence. 
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As a form of controlled critique, Krokodil exercised the power of tension 
management in a number of ways. Being the main official publication that referred to 
informal practices, Krokodil—itself perhaps being a form of false reporting—declared to 
perform the functions of producing Soviet satire, of eradicating social ills, and of giving a 
platform for revealing critique and self-critique (samokritika) for the system but could not 
deliver. Officially published and therefore working within the boundaries established by 
the ideological constraints, Krokodil was only partially about the satire—but partially it 
was about adequate “framing” of social ills and their “satirization.”  By introducing 
themes and boundaries—what to smile at, how and where—Krokodil socialized and 
educated the Soviet public on the matters of everyday life.19 On its pages one can see 
some depictions of the 1930s, 1950s, 1980s but not others and therefore conclude what 
can be discussed, criticized and satirized and what cannot (this function of Krokodil 
would be similar to satirical publications in other societies). While claiming the task of 
eradication of social ills, Krokodil also was engaged in educating the public on how to 
react to certain themes and concerns. It was a pedagogical device, like most Soviet mass 
culture, assisting the “misrecognition game” of every historical period.20 The ways of 
revealing social ills to the public were also the ways of concealment. Most importantly, 
Krokodil inverted the role that satire has in other societies—to criticize—into the one that 
it does not have in other societies—to de-moralize people and to make them complicit in 
the failures of the regime. It wasn’t just about force, oppression, rewards for co-optation 
or inclusion that brought people into that system—it was through the smile and shared 
mastery of the system. 
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By the 1980s, understanding of the formal (and enabling) nature of constraints and 
acknowledgement of the possibility of circumventing them became almost universal—a 
variety of know-how was shared by insiders of a circle, a group or society as a whole. 
Depending on the reference group, open secrets varied in degree of openness. Blat is an 
example of a widely acknowledged open secret—even twenty years since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, only 7% of an all-Russia national survey found it difficult to define 
blat, in contrast to 30% having difficulty in defining another late Soviet practice of 
telefonnoe pravo (telephone justice), standing for oral commands to the judiciary.21  
 
Knowing Smiles 
In a way, the very question ‘Why do people smile about open secrets that are neither 
funny nor enjoyable in any obvious way?’ may already suggest an answer. A knowing 
smile is not a smile of joy or laughter. Even if reminiscent of the Russian literary tradition 
of ‘laughter through tears,’22 the knowing smile is relieved of intense emotions because of 
the mundane nature of open secrets—the familiarity that brings contempt rather than 
laughter or tears.  
I identify a knowing smile as a routine signal of acknowledgement and competent 
mastery of open secrets, where the emotional content is minimal. Conceptually, the 
knowing smile is not about facial expressions of emotions. Ekman describes many kinds 
of smiles, from the ‘felt’ smile to the fear smile, the contempt smile, the dampened smile, 
the miserable smile, and a number of others but warns against a non-specialist 
deciphering the person’s less routine signals. 23 He points out that until very recently, both 
scientists and laymen knew very little about emotion, despite its importance in human 
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lives and there are reasons for it: “it is in the nature of emotion itself that we would not 
fully know how emotions influence us and how we recognize their signs in ourselves and 
others.”24 Ekman argues that emotions can begin and change so quickly that our 
conscious self does not participate in or even witness what in our mind triggers an 
emotion at any particular moment.  
I therefore do not seek to identify or interpret emotions behind the knowing smiles 
that I tend to come across in the field. In tune with analytical bias of social sciences, I am 
more interested in knowing smiles as pointers to the open secrets and the non-articulated 
knowledge that people prefer to leave ambiguous. Using material from my previous and 
current research, I construe ideal types of knowing smiles that reflect possible patterns of 
mastery of blat, as a proxy of an open secret, based on emotions displayed, identified or 
used for rationalization by my respondents. Knowing smiles about blat can be associated 
with three basic attitudes to open secrets—‘positive,’ ‘neutral’ and ‘negative’—perhaps 
concealing a varying degree of personal involvement and illustrating forms of dealing 
with ambivalence. 
At a very basic level, chats about blat produce a smile of linguistic recognition. 
As was expressed best by Zhvanetskii: ‘only those who belong would understand…’ 
(tol’ko svoi ponimaet kak prinosit’ pol’zu obschestvu vopreki ego zhe zakonam). The 
pleasure of sharing untranslatable ‘games of words,’ behind which, in Zhvanetskii’s 
satirical piece, hide the untranslatable “games of deeds”—what I call informal practices—
provides a sense of belonging to a circle of people who “know how.”25 Just as it is a 
pleasure to recognize a foreign idiom or understand a joke, it is enjoyable to recognize a 
native ‘language game’ that points to an open secret that might be tricky for a foreigner to 
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understand. A knowing smile of belonging (“we are all complicit in our own oppression 
and in our own corruption”) is most common but it also has an implication of dividing us 
and them, “subconsciously indicating secret pleasure from co-operation” between us 
against them. “Us” implies complicity of people of the circle who care about each other. 
“Them” refers to the state, strangers, or outsiders, who take care of themselves. Such 
division is representative of what Gudkov has referred to as ‘negative identity.’26  
Other knowing smiles associated with guilty pleasures include the one of the 
“pleasure of doing something wrong,” the “pleasure of perversion;” the “pleasure of 
crossing boundaries in the society which is overregulated;” or, in Sloterdijk’s phrase, “the 
crooked smile of open immortality.” Empowering an individual through crossing some 
boundaries, conscious or unconscious, feeds into one of the central themes in my study of 
informal practices—the enabling power of constraints. Knowing smiles (audacious, 
mischievous or naughty) can imply active use of constraints; “positive opportunism,” 
experience of turning the weaknesses of the system  (prokoly sistemy) to one’s advantage, 
known as “cheating the state” or “beating the system,” all pointing to the satisfaction 
from covert systems of rewards and abuse of state institutions in totalitarian regimes.  
Reactions associated with indifference and a weak emotional charge—the 
knowing smiles associated with ignorance, apathy or acceptance—are no less important. 
Dismissive smiles “undermine the significance of the issue or indicate lack of interest or 
concern” while accepting smiles can display anything from admission of the necessity of 
blat involved, directly or indirectly”), the individual helplessness vis-à-vis the regime, as 
well as the overall acceptance of the ways things are, failure or not. Often, the knowing 
smile is a way of disguising ignorance and erroneous associations.27 In such cases, the 
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knowing smile is a cover for not understanding the processes at work—“of course I 
understand what’s going on”—when in fact, it is a form of laziness. Neutral smiles not 
only emphasize the openness of open secrets and the widespread scale of blat practices, 
but also provide an escape route from taking them seriously by turning them into a 
smiling matter. They tackle uncertainty and display a passive habit of acceptance, the 
habitus28 of Homo Sovieticus that ensures that one does not articulate or even question 
what the open secret really is about while smiling knowingly. Neutral knowing smiles are 
similar to what Goffman identifies as ‘civil inattention,’ and are thus most functional in 
signaling and testifying normality (“the unserious nature of practices as opposed to the 
big corruption scandals”) and enabling people to ‘go on.’29  
 More negative knowing smiles can be associated with containment of 
embarrassment, shame or guilt. These smiles (shifty, awkward, uncomfortable, nervous 
smiles) present a way of “easing out of the situation” or a defense reaction. Following 
Bourdieu, I describe a number of strategies by which one can be involved in blat 
transactions while also misrecognising doing so—misrecognition as a system of denial, as 
a system of ambivalence, and as a system of power.30 The intermediation of blat 
transactions is essential to protect one’s positive and altruistic self-image and to 
misrecognise one’s own experiences: one helps a friend, not oneself, and that friend 
returns a favor eventually. Both parties maintain a ‘good friend’ self-image while using 
public resources for ‘non-selfish’ purposes. When the moral norms prescribe that one 
must help a friend but also that blat is immoral and unethical, the ‘misrecognition game’ 
is the way out. This is the key function of the ‘misrecognition game’—to serve the 
situations of moral or logical squeeze, to deal with the paradoxes of the system, and in 
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this particular case to allow personal engagement in blat practices while blaming it as a 
generic practice. “Blat is everywhere but what I do is not blat” is the key defensive 
narrative of respondents.31  
 The subtlety of the misrecognition game has informed my methodology of 
research on informal practices: speak about generic practice, not personal experience; let 
the experience trickle down through narrative; speak about others (neighbors, other firms, 
friends); speak about the past if the research is about know-how that is no longer in use. 
That is to say, one cannot study open secrets by speaking about them directly—they have 
to be taken into a comfort zone. In a way, studying paradoxes requires a correspondingly 
paradoxical methodology: the most direct way of studying an open secret is to study it 
indirectly; to find it one should not look for it; to develop marginality to see what’s on the 
inside; to go away to see the bigger picture; to use the “rear mirror” methodology etc. In 
the context of studying open secrets, knowing smiles are essential, following Goffman, to 
assess the most profound features of societies through seemingly trivial aspects of 
everyday behavior. Sensitivities displayed in people’s accounts and explanations of 
knowing smiles provide insights on their own relationship with the open secrets, as well 
as on relationships within their networks and possibly also their projection of the 
interviewer.32 An additional challenge for a researcher of sensitive practices is to 
historicize their elusive meaning defined by period, place and context (including all 
varieties of collective identities)—a challenge taken up by the growing field of the history 
of emotions.33 In the beginning of the 1990s, it became possible to ask people to 
articulate their views on Soviet informal practices without constraint, just as in the 1950s, 
those who left the Soviet Union were able to describe their blat experience in the Harvard 
 18 
Interviewing Project,34 the collapse of the Soviet Union have made blat a matter of the 
past and thus enabled people to articulate it.  
 
What do knowing smiles do? 
When reciprocated, the knowing smile is a sign of sharing awareness and ability “to read 
between the lines,” “to see behind the façade,” with some complicity in “beating the 
system” but without shouting out the “emperor has no clothes” secret. To put it in 
Simmel’s terms, “although at first sight an empty form, [a knowing smile-AL] is an 
excellent symbol of that reciprocal apprehension, which is the presumption of every 
social relationship.”35 The ‘emptiness’ of the knowing smile may signify the inability to 
articulate tacit knowledge (the actual workings of paradoxes are complicated)36 but it 
enables the reproduction of daily interactions without pressure of recognition of one’s 
own compromised behavior or the failures of the system. It allows people to go on with 
their everyday lives and helps the system to reproduce itself. The ‘emptiness’ of the 
knowing smile is also relevant in the sense that knowing smiles in the stagnation period 
would not be the same as the knowing smile under Stalinism—its content is contextual 
and defined by whatever social competence may involve in a particular period.  
All types of knowing smiles have a common denominator—the social competence 
of handling open secrets and dealing with situations of moral ambiguity or ethical 
squeeze, regardless of expressed attitude or emotional load. Social competence embraces 
tacit knowledge about what’s normal, the ability ‘to go on,’ a skill to turn formal 
constraints to one’s advantage and a capacity to play the ‘doublethink’ game in self-
defense and in the defense of the system people lived under. It implies ambivalence about 
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the idea of being honest, upright, and dedicated to official goals. “Someone who readily 
believes whatever official discourse says has no independent thought.”37 ‘Independence,’ 
‘individualism,’ ‘civic rights’ in totalitarian societies are channeled through distance, 
‘doublethink’ and ‘double-deed.’ In his classic novel [1984], Orwell defines doublethink 
as “the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously.”  
“The Party intellectual knows in which direction his memories must be altered; he 
therefore knows that he is playing tricks with reality; but by the exercise of 
doublethink he also satisfies himself that reality is not violated. . . . [T]he essential 
act of the Party is to use conscious deception while retaining the firmness of 
purpose that goes with complete honesty. . . . To tell deliberate lies while 
genuinely believing in them . . . all this is indispensably necessary”.38  
Taken out of humorous contexts and into the everyday workings of society, the knowing 
smile—whether as a sign of recognition, misrecognition, or both— serves to point out 
open secrets, tensions or ambiguities, that individuals are forced to resolve themselves 
whether they deny, accept, fight or benefit from the existing gap between the official 
discourse and the way things get done in practice. Bridging that gap is left to individuals, 
which is well-illustrated in an early Soviet anekdot. A politburo member is giving a 
speech about industrialization and twenty-storey skyscrapers recently built on Karl Marx 
Street in Kharkov. Suddenly one of the listeners interrupts him:   
‘Comrade Kalinin, I am from Khar’kov. I walk down that street every day, but I 
have not seen any skyscrapers!’ 
‘Comrade,’ replies Kalinin, ‘instead of loitering on the streets you should read 
newspapers and find out what’s going on in your city.’39  
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In tune with this folklore, Arendt theorizes totalitarian ideologies as those aiming not at 
the transformation of the outside world but at the transformation of human nature.40 
Within two decades of her analysis, Zinoviev published his The Yawning Hights and 
Homo Sovieticus, and Levada provided the post-Soviet empirical evidence for the Homo 
Sovieticus diagnosis:     
The Soviet experiment produced not so much a new human type as an individual 
who was wholly adapted to Soviet reality, one willing to accept it as a given, with 
no alternative. A society that was closed on all sides, even from its own historical 
reality, raised generations who could not imagine any way of life except the one 
they were given. The lack of alternatives turned the universal practice of 
adaptation into a habit, a mass behavioral structure that was neither dissected nor 
subject to analysis.41 
In his 2001 analysis, Levada phrases it sharply and suggests little change in the Homo 
Post-Sovieticus’s attitude to ethics. 
At the individual level, the whole system of deals made with the state, which was 
intrinsic to the Soviet arrangement, inevitably led to moral corruption, the 
acceptance of sham, the padding of figures, string pulling, bribery, and 
doublethink. These conditions were necessary if society and the economy were to 
function. The collapse of the Soviet system did not introduce anything 
fundamentally new; it only eliminated the social and institutional (punitive) 
regulators that had limited the effect of the corrupting mechanisms.42  
In his deconstruction of the dichotomy between ‘officials’ and ‘people,’ Alexei Yurchak 
analyses the role that political ridicule by the powerless played in expressing their 
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relationship with the authority. He argues that the stagnation resulted in people’s 
perception of official ideological representation of social reality as largely false but at the 
same time as immutable and omnipresent. “In such conditions it became irrelevant 
whether people believed official ideological messages or not.” Instead, the relation to the 
officialdom became based on intricate strategies of simulated support and on ‘nonofficial’ 
practices. Yurchak argues that such a changing relationship between citizens and power 
eventually resulted in the ideological change that occurred in the mid-1980s.43 
Given the importance of socialization in producing knowing smiles, one might 
imagine that changes in bringing up and educating younger generations could lead to the 
evaporation of Soviet-style practices. Yet the legitimacy of informal practices among the 
younger generations in Russia remains in place.44 Levada’s data suggests that groups 
under forty find evasion of military service justified: the youngest respondents, directly 
subject to conscription, are more than twice as likely to justify draft evasion as to 
condemn it.45 Consequent knowing smiles, competence in draft evasion know-how and 
the doublethink about civic duty are thus set in motion. Unless such open secrets are 
articulated, explained or integrated into policies and cultural exchange, the fundamental 
non-transparency of societies is not going to diminish.46 
The near ubiquitous exchange of knowing smiles in everyday contexts and their 
capacity for maintaining ambiguity up to now mostly has escaped dissection and analysis. 
Yet such exchanges are the basis of normality and routine interaction that is so 
fundamental for the modus operandi in societies according to Goffman.47 The function of 
knowing smiles is that by dismissing their importance and by accepting commonplaces 
that rules out reflection upon them, they reproduce unwritten rules and open secrets and 
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thus the system of power based on everybody’s complicity in it. In other words, smiling at 
open secrets is an acceptance that is conducive to the non-contestation of power. 
Knowing smiles are the integral part of maintaining the ambiguity about the official 
discourse of power elites and the unwritten rules they rely on to continue to stay in power. 
One is forced to keep open secrets a secret while also following the unwritten rules and 
fluently engaging in informal practices that bridge the gaps between formal constraints of 
the system and its informal impositions. Such an arrangementt makes one the insider of 
the system but also makes one complicit and fundamentally dependent on the system. The 
system makes people complicit in their own demoralization and their own corruption.48  
My experience in Russia is not unique. In his recent book on talk and silence 
about corruption in the Pacific Islands, Peter Larmour observes that when he mentions he 
is doing research on corruption, peoples’ faces tend to ‘light up.’49 In contrast to the 
dangers of studying corruption, intricacies of fieldwork abroad, and epistemological 
taboos of research into ‘shadows’, as Carolyn Nordstrom calls it, my focus here is on 
mundane behavior. Smiling at open secrets is no doubt in some ways a universal practice, 
not restricted to the Soviet doublethink or to its post-Soviet reincarnation. People do not 
have to live under the Soviet system to smile at the anekdot of its six paradoxes. The 
context of telling an anekdot prepares one for smiling and provokes a smile of recognition 
of a different kind, not necessarily of familiarity with the reality of socialism but of 
ambiguity, or the unfolding of paradoxes, or by proxy of one’s own experiences. The 
manipulative use of the formal rules and using them to one’s own personal advantage 
may be particularly strong in repressive systems but is not limited to them. This is 
illustrated by the studies of corruption and rent-seeking behavior in the Middle East, 
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Asian, Latin American and African resource-rich economies, as well as in the recent 
analyses of the 2008 sub-prime crisis elsewhere.50 On a wider scale, Sloterdijk identifies a 
universal trend of diffuse cynicism in modernity and an ironic treatment of ethics and of 
social conventions, “as if universal laws existed only for the stupid, while the fatally 
clever smile plays on the lips of those in the know”.51   
Reflection on my years of fieldwork in post-Soviet Russia has helped to generate 
further questions. Knowing smiles are partially about smiling, partially about knowing.  
Knowing open secrets is partially about knowing, partially also about not knowing and 
not questioning. It is sign of awareness of transgression but also of recognition of things 
one does not need to spell out. Masked hostility – expressed through ribbing – towards 
the researcher ‘daring’ to expose all this to the light is indicative of these tensions. The 
semi-taboos against knowing, the complicity to leave things unarticulated, the 
ambiguities hidden behind open secrets are all pointers to sensitive subjects that could 
lead to innovative research. 
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